tv Washington This Week CSPAN March 16, 2014 7:00pm-8:01pm EDT
if this is true. we have requested a copy, but the cia has yet to provide it. to see ai would like public statement from the white house committing to the fullest possible declassification of the committee's study as well as the cia's response to the study. i understand that you are not in a position on your own to provide these documents, but confirmation processes are one way that u.s. senators can ensure that our voices are heard. i do not believe my requests are unreasonable. i want the cia to know that i take them seriously. with that, i have a question for you. in our meeting last week, we talked about the critical role of the justice in reviewing intelligence rogue rams and the importance of intelligence oversight by congress. can you elaborate on your views
on these matters? number one, the doj and the importance of congress' intellig and number two, how your views will guide your interactions with this committee, engagements with it -- and engagements with the doj. completely agree that this committee plays a critical role in the oversight of the cia, particularly because so much of the work of the cia has to remain secret by its nature. this committee needs to provide the important checks and balances that would normally be provided, in addition, by the american public in those circumstances. i think the doj plays a critical role in giving advice to the agency. for advice is authoritative the agency. i would consider it my duty to
sake sure that the committee were informed of all intelligence activities. i would also make sure that the information provided to the department of justice and to the legal counsel was accurate and timely and up-to-date. it, i havece with interacted many times with lawyers from the agency. my experience has been very positive in terms of always feeling like we get the information that we need to give our advice and we are updated as things change, if that happens to be the case. i think that policy advice is not useful to a client agency unless the advice is based on the facts as they really are. otherwise, the client agency has an opinion that is addressing a different situation that is --
then the one that is truly presented. if i were confirmed, i would make sure that practice would continue the way it has been functioning. i have a good sense of what types of information they need. >> thank you for that answer. i look forward to more information on all these topics. senator collins raised important questions on how this committee and the intelligence committee continues to work together. we all have the same goal in mind, which is to protect this country, but also the most valuable set of principles that we hold dear, the bill of rights and our constitution. thank you. senator burr, were you here before me? >> thank you, madam chair. smith, i have heard glowing reports about your
professionalism. you thated to both of it is my practice to let you all know about the areas i am going to get into. onay, let me start with you cia interrogation. the big interrogation report that the committee approved, senator udall referred to it and discussed representations to the department of justice regarding coercive interrogation. you indicated to me yesterday that you had read the report. based on information in the report, does it appear to you that the cia provided our justice department awful legal counsel with acceptably accurate information about the coercive interrogation program? >> based on my reading of that section of the report, i agree with what the former general
counsel said, which was that the information provided fell short of the normal type of information that is provided. >> so the answer would be no. >> yes, i think that is right. >> you have told us that it does not appear to you that the cia divided the justice department with except ugly accurate information, correct? acceptably accurate information, correct? >> yes. >> we talked about this in the office. ins is a particular opinion the office of legal counsel. i have been concerned about it. it is inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law and i believe it needs to be withdrawn. you are familiar with it. , as ast question is
senior government attorney, would you rely on the legal reasoning contained in this opinion? >> at your request, i did review that opinion from 2003. opinion the age of the and, at the time, it was described as an issue of first impression as well as the evolving technology as well as the edge -- the evolution of case law, i would not rely on that opinion. >> i appreciate that. again, your candor is helpful. because we talked about this. so that is encouraging. but i want to make sure nobody else ever relies on that particular opinion. i am concerned that aid different attorney could take a different view and argue that the opinion is still legally valid because it has not been withdrawn. we have tried to get the attorney general holder to withdraw it. who atying to figure out
the justice department has the authority to withdraw the subpoena. theou currently have authority to withdraw the opinion? >> no. >> who does? >> for an opinion to be owndrawn on olc's initiative or the initiative of the and turn general -- of the attorney general would be extremely unusual and would happen only under a stored very circumstances. if there is an opinion that has been given to a particular agency, if that agency would like olc to reconsider the opinion or if another component of the executive branch would like olc to reconsider the opinion, they will come to ol see -- to olc and say, this is why we think you were wrong and we believe the opinion could be corrected. they will be doing that when
they have a practical need for the opinions because of particular operational activities that they would like to conduct. i have been thinking about your question. i understand your serious concerns about this opinion. that seems possible to me is that you could ask for an assurance from the relevant elements of the intelligence community that they would not rely on the opinion. i can give you my assurance that if i were confirmed, i would not rely on the opinion. that.ppreciate you were very straightforward in saying that. , unless thes me is opinion is withdrawn, at some point, somebody else might be tempted to reach the opposite conclusion. again, i appreciate the way you have handled the sensitive matter and i am going to continue to prosecute the case for getting this opinion withdrawn. i thank you. >> thank you very much, senator wyden.
senator hinrich western mark >> -- senator hinrich? >> i have looked at both of your and came away impressed. mr. smith, you and i have not had an opportunity to talk at length. but i look forward to that. i had an opportunity to sit down ss last week and i want to thank her for her candor . before i begin, let me associate myself with the comments of my colleagues. once again, our staff is still waiting for several documents that we have requested. these requests are not unreasonable. the amount of time it is taking to produce them is. as much as anyone, i want to say the committee study of the cia's enhanced interrogation program finished and released. that cannot happen while the cia
slow walks the documents that we have requested. we do not have many options available to force the agency's i will not rule out any in order to get the agency to finally cooperate with our requests. i want to thank the chairman for her leadership in getting this study written and i want to mention something that happened this afternoon. i am outraged that the cia continues to make misleading public statements about the committee's study of the cia interrogation program. there is only one instance in which the cia pointed out a factual error in the study. a minor error that has been corrected. , where the cia and the committee differ, we differ on interpretation and conclusions from an agreed-upon factual record. you cannot publicly call our differences of opinion significant errors in press releases. it is misleading. these are not factual errors.
you are to read the study during the six months. these statements were crafted by the agency, statements that continue today even after the committee staff pointed out the many errors in the agency's response. i am convinced more now than ever that we need to declassify the full report so that those with a political agenda and no longer manipulate public opinion by making false representations about what may be, what is or is not in that study. atcomments are not directed our nominees, but i felt i had to dress this given the highly deflating article today. given theess this highly deflating article today. i do have some follow-up questions related to what we discussed last week. i asked about the current enhancedof the cia's
interrogation techniques. in responding, you pointed to the detainee treatment act of 2005 and the military commissions act of 2006 and noted that those laws were not in place at the time of the cia's detention and interrogation program when it began in 2002. this mighted that prohibit the future use of harsh interrogation techniques. however, these have both been signed into law by july 20 of 2007, when a predecessor of yours at the office of legal statement thata the cia could continue to use those techniques, including dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, and others. although this opinion has since been withdrawn, it is clear that there is disagreement over whether the actions taken by congress over the last decade have settled the legality of the use of harsh interrogation that many consider torture. current decision not to use
cruel interrogation techniques is seen by some as only a decision rooted in current policy, not law. in other words, president obama's executive order which explicitly confined interrogation techniques to those found in the army field manual could be rescinded by a future president. this leaves open the possibility that a future president and cia, perhaps based on the misinformation currently in the public realm about their seek toeness, might resume those techniques. president obama's executive your notwithstanding, do believe that the interrogation techniques mentioned previously could legally be used today despite the war crimes act as amended by the military commissions act, the detainee treatment act, and common article three of the geneva convention? >> i have not had an opportunity to evaluate each of the techniques that are covered in
the 2007 memo. as you indicated, first of all, in terms of the current state of the law, the president has outlawed the use of any of those techniques and has said that only techniques consistent with the army field manual are allowed for the cia to conduct any interrogation. the cia is not in the detention business anymore. if i were confirmed, it would be my first duty to make sure that those restrictions and prohibitions are followed. there is a great deal of intection for detainees common article three of the geneva convention as well as the detainee treatment act, which prohibits anyone from being subject to cruel punishment and that is reference to the type of punishment that would be unlawful under the fifth, 18th, or 14th amendments. >> i believe my time is expired.
>> it is, but i am very generous to you. senator burr? >> thank you. let me say to your children, if your mother does not get you everything for christmas that you want, you are still in a position to hold her in that committee. i want you to know that. [laughter] the committee has direct jurisdiction over the state department of intelligence and research. would you agree that for our committee to conduct effective oversight, we should have access to the intelligence products inr?ed by -- produced by and the raw reporting that contributes to any analysis? for all of our intelligence reports, our assessments, and other products that inr produces.
i wouldis not the case, certainly undertake to review that and see if we can share it more broadly. i believe a lot of this is done now electronically. >> you are right. will you continue to provide this committee with all of the inructs that the inr por -- produces. >> it would be my commitment if i am confirmed the -- if i am confirmed. >> do you believe it is in the inr's charter to provide support? >> absolutely. one of our principal customers is the president of the united states. >> in the years since the attacks on benghazi, inr did not disseminate any independent analysis related to the attacks. considering they began at a state department facility and wo state the deaths of t
department personnel and were an important indication of the escalating threats against u.s. facilities in the region, do you feel that was appropriate? my understanding, of course, i was not in the bureau at the time and i was overseas route much of this time. contribute and coordinate on a number of projects related to events in libya and ongoing developments there. it would not have been appropriate for inr to have played a role in looking back at what happened. there were a number of different vehicles that reviewing that, including the accountability review board, that was undertaking a study. inr did provide access to all of the information at its disposal on continued to coordinate i.c. products. i have heard concerns about providednr could have
more information and analysis on the overall context than what is happening in libya. i will certainly take that under advisement and see if we can do that. fact is, this committee was told many times by the state department that we did not have any jurisdiction over the state department. would you agree that we have some jurisdiction at the state department? >> over the department of research. >> will you commit to ensuring products are more responsive to world events? >> it is my desire to do as much as i can to ensure that they are timely and appropriate, absolutely. >> do you agree with the state department's recommendation that inr should produce a comprehensive security basedment for each post on all available diplomatic and intelligence sources? this is something that, if i am confirmed, i would like to look into. what i want to make sure is that
we are cooperating closely in providing as much information as is needed by department policy makers, including the bureau of diplomatic security, which has an ongoing responsibility for safety and security of our missions overseas, so that they have the tools that they need to make these determinations. whether this should rest more that with inr is something i would certainly look into. on the surface, at least. is ald say that inr's role supporting one in this regard. >> do you see any other relevant state components in relation to congress and your treatment of the analysis you put together? for all of us to be customers. >> diplomatic security as part of the department of state and we are all subject to congressional oversight. >> thank you. >> thank you, madam chair. bennett, i am not going to
ask you a question and i apologize for that. i am simply going to say that i spent two productive years in the state department working for roger hilton. -- hillsman. he lost the battle for what the war in vietnam was about. he lost his job and i lost my job. for a while, i was very happy. krass, i want to take this up a bit. committee report that we ago was notar or so only historic, but it was the single largest, most significant oversight effort in the history of our committee. it took nine years. to do that. 11,000 pages, close to 50,000 footnotes.
you cannot argue with footnotes. you cannot argue with footnotes. plus 5000, 11,000 total. i started working on this committee just before 9/11. ofegan to doubt the accuracy the information that the cia provided me and former chairman pat roberts about this program. -- i sayhis report this with all my heart -- to provide a constructive oversight that has a positive impact on the cia's operation and relationship with this committee, which we have to correct. i expect and hope that the agency's leadership is trying to steer a slightly different course from the approach in that news article today. i see that possibility clearly. that is not the best path to take, which was put out in the
paper today, and i think the cia leadership knows that. i look for better things. report, weopted our have invested significant time and effort to refine it. this is a committee that has lived with frustration in which , the twogang of four chair wered vice allowed to visit with vice president cheney in his office or whatever. for years, we had to fight just so that we could all be breathed -- briefed. it was a massive, lengthy fight. you have to understand that in terms of where we are coming from. but we are honorable people, we are tenacious people, and we have been working diligently with staff to work out some of the tedious details. i myself has had -- have had
multiple rounds of correspondence and meetings with director brendan -- brennan and also clapper about the big political issues. why is this so important to me? because the interrogation use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not just an appropriate way to collect intelligence, it was a tragic mistake of great significance in the history of this country. simply, it was wrong. the question now is, what are we going to do about it? that is what this report is about. discussions that have been ongoing recently have been about. as a country, are we going to learn from this tragic mistake? is the cia going to take a hard look at itself and tackle these problems or is it going to circle the wagons once again? as one of the top leaders of the counsel,d the senior
the next cia general counsel, which i hope will be you, will have a centrally important role in this effort and where we go from here. where we go from here is everything in terms of not only this committee, which hangs around a long time, but also for the cia as a whole. the feeling that they can talk to us and that they do not put out the kind of leaks that the good senator from new mexico was talking about. he is mad. i am mad. we are all mad. they just come and they come. cia'sneral counsel is the legal advisor, not its defense attorney. the general counsel provides the institution and its leaders advice and counsel about the laws that govern the cia activities and its role in our democracy. my question for you is simple. would you counsel the cia to face forward and learn from the program andm this
implement lessons learned in the future or continue hunkering down in defensive rationalizations and past shortcomings? >> senator, i absolutely would look forward and take advantage of the lessons learned in moving forward and make sure the that the agency -- and make sure that .he agency is operating i believe that the client is the agency ultimately and then the american people. withknow you are familiar general counsel steve preston's thoughts on the inaccurate information that the cia provided to legal authorities about this program. most people do not know this. we cannot talk about it. you all cannot talk about it. the press can say anything they want and they will always go for the gotcha area.
people lose confidence in government. if you are confirmed, what will you do to ensure that misinformation like this does not happen again from the position of power that you will have a question mark >> i will do everything i can if i am confirmed -- the possession of power that you will have? >> i will do everything i can if i am confirmed and make sure the committee is apprised of any activities. , but is not just the law practices within the agency that have developed over the years. suspicion of us and unwillingness to deal with us, i somehow feel that they have to -- we do not know what we are talking about. if i were confirmed, i would pledge that i would work closely with this committee to make sure that you get the information that you need to conduct effective oversight. >> leader member, you have
the twoootnotes in studies that we spent nine years writing. i thank you and i thank the chair. >> senator levin. >> thank you, madam chairman. ms. krass, the documents that have been looked at by this committee in great detail show that the cia provided inaccurate information on its detention and interrogation program to others in the executive branch, including information that was attended to and form legal opinions by the department of
office of legal counsel, in which you serve at the time. prehearing policy ,uestions in his nomination stephen preston said the following. understanding is that the department of justice did not always have accurate information about the detention and interrogation program and that the actual conduct of that program was not always consistent with the way the program had been described to the department of justice." he said that he understood that, in a number of instances, enhanced interrogation techniques at waterboarding were applied substantially more frequently than had frequently been described to the doj. i cannot say what the doj would or would not have considered material at the time.
a comparable situation, i would consider information of this nature to be material. do you agree with him that inaccurate information divided by the cf -- divided -- provided issue for the an program? >> based on my reading of the report, i completely agree with his assessment that the sharing of information fell well short of the current practices that are followed in interactions between olc and the cia. i have personal experience with that from the other side, of course. i do not know whether the information that was provided that was not accurate would have changed the end result of the opinions that were drafted by the olc. i just do not know.
>> just because you do not have an opinion? to -- i have gone not had the chance to take the types of information that were different and measure them against the opinion. -- itk stephen preston certainly would have changed his judgment. it likely would have changed my judgment as well. i am not sure what my judgment would have been in the first place. or notked about whether inaccurate information was supplied and your information -- and your answer was something fell short. my question now, was inaccurate information supplied? >> based on the reading of it -- on my reading of the report, it seemed like inaccurate information was. , iyou made a reference believe, to senator feinstein's opinionsabout legal that go from the olc to the
resident or the white -- to the president or the white house. i think your question or your answer was that these are re-decision opinions -- pr e-decision opinions. i do not know if you got into that any further, but let me pursue that a little bit more. at some point, there is a decision made by the president or someone in the executive branch. presumably the president. at that point, would you agree that we, in congress, have a right to know what that decision was based on legally? that once theeve agency has decided on a course of action, you have the right to know what course of action they are pursuing as well as a full understanding of the legal basis.
>> so that we are entitled to know what the legal basis is for a president's decision. >> as members of congress, you would be entitled to be able to oversee -- >> that is not my question. opinions thatal informed the decision-maker. once the decision is made, are we then entitled to have access to those opinions? >> you are absolutely entitled to understanding -- >> the question is, are we entitled access to the opinions which informed the decision-making? after he makes the decision? >> even after he makes the decision, the reason why the -- it was given in the context where there might not be a decision to go forward. that confidential legal advice, i believe, enables the effective functioning of the executive branch because keeping the
coveted jelly allows for full discussions between lawyers and policymakers. they can ask questions and be fully candid. your answer is we are not entitled to any legal opinion rendered to the executive branch decision-makers even after the decision is made. is that correct? been you know, there have -- >> is that correct? >> it is a caveat of the answer that i want to say that in president has the direct sharing -- >> do we have a right as part of our oversight process? >> i do not think so as a general matter. >> the president could decide to give us access, but we have no right to access. >> you have a right to understand the legal basis, but not necessarily to the opinions. >> thank you. my time is up.
>> thank you. first of all, thank you both for your service to our country. congratulations to your family. for the sacrifices they make. i want to share with you a concern i have about what i believe is a lack of a coherent policy on terrorist interrogation. i want to ask your opinion on whether the intelligence value and people apprehended outside the united states. >> i think there can be intelligence value. i believe it is vertical that the first operation should be together intelligence from that
terrorist. it should be consistent with the possibility of reserving -- pre serving either a military commission or -- >> do you think the law enforcement in place allows us to achieve those objectives? >> yes i do. >> ambassador smith, let me make this comment -- there are two things that i want to explore with you. thatng back at the tragedy occurred in benghazi, it was apparent that there was an increasing stream of reporting available to the state department about the dangers and the volatility of the area regarding the diplomatic mission before it was attacked. there were no measures taken to secure the temporary facility or efficient measures were not taken. i want to ask you whether you believe the inr role should be -- let me go further on that before i ask you the question. in the aftermath, both the inr
and intelligence community knew in the day of the attack that it was not a spontaneous demonstration that had turned violent. how do you believe the inr provides relevant intelligence to the agency process, the decision-makers, etc. what is the role that you see with that moving forward? the primary role is to provide an understanding for the context in which we are operating abroad. and to make sure that policymakers and certain elements within the department have access to intelligence information that could affect the safety and security of our mission and personnel overseas. this is one of the things, if i am confirmed, i want to make sure we have done right in terms of making sure they have accessed everything that they need and that we are providing the broader contextual
understanding of what is going on. >> my second question is more policy related. we had a statement a few days ago from the israeli defense minister about his belief and areerns that the iranians using their embassies to build a terrorist infrastructure. there is a published congressional mandate to counter the influence. what are your views on their influence in the western particular,nd in are you familiar with the state department strategy on this? >> i am not familiar on that issue. i would like to take a question for the record, if you would like. >> ok, thank you. >> let me verify one thing on the nsa situation. it is my understanding that this hise, judge leon, made
restraining order or his injunction, which has been stayed and that was announced last month. a district court judge in southern california, jeffrey opinion inounced his a man whoch involves was convicted on three counts of support for terrorism, specifically financial and monetary, specifically involving al-shabab. he was tried and convicted and a case was brought on this point. n saide judge's opinio that the program was constitutional, that no one had a fourth amendment right on metadata.
thatew of the situation is i welcome a supreme court review . it has been more than 30 years. we did not have terrorism when smith the maryland -- smith v. maryland was put forward. that was 1979. we did not have cell phones as well. perhaps it is a good opportunity, now that we have conflicting opinions and we have 15 judges that have never found the case on constitutional -- unconstitutional as it reviews the program every 90 days and reauthorizes it. that now a believe federal court judge has declared the case or declare the program programred the
unconstitutional. there are different opinions now and that is the state of play. it will be appealed and the supreme court will eventually make a decision, which is the appropriate thing. i also want to say that i do not believe that there is any member of this committee that wants to support a program that is unconstitutional. support those things which can enable us to protect this country and we believe that that program is one of them. not the only one, but one of them. it is our intention to review other programs and look at these programs with some serious scrutiny based on the law. so i think your position is really most important in all of this. that is, of course, where senator wyden has been pressing,
i have been pressing on the o lc opinions. unless we know the administration basis for sanctioning a program, it is very hard to oversee it. -- and i was going to ask this question. bybee wrote jay that congress may no longer regulate the ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants and that it may regulate its ability for troop movements. where am i going with this? where i am going is that we have to know what regulations, rules, laws enable the president to move and say yes, do this. it, it is verye hard to exercise oversight now. the administration might want
that. they might not want us to exercise due oversight, but that is the purpose of our being. thatlly want you to know close up and personal. because you're going to encounter some heat from us in that regard. i think most of us who have been here a long time and we know --t we need this information not just we can give them that ,ut we cannot give them that that is holding up things that this committee has asked for, specifically with regards to the intention and interrogation report. it is so very sensitive with us. i have been after this staff, complete the cia reviews where it is appropriate and we can change the report. where it is not appropriate and
take the fact that the cia disagrees and why they disagree, but let us get on with it. let's vote to declassify the summary and recommendations and findings, about 300 pages. we are prepared to do that. i mentioned it today and again the staff said we have asked for this information from the cia and we have not received it. so we cannot really complete what we need to complete. ask that ourke to staff sit down with you and explain to you exactly what it is and that you take some action. -- not toen able to obviously have a positive response. that is a cumbersome rhetoric,
but it is often top. will you do that? to workly would like closely with this committee to make sure that you get access to and i havetion already taken your concerns about the pieces of information, particularly that senator udall mentioned when i met with him. >> good. if you would please let me know what the response is, i would appreciate that very much. >> i will make sure that that happens. >> i also will notice if there is no response. so thank you. any other comments? >> the only thing i would add is that the chairman and i have made a request of the entire programs about all that are operational type programs within the agency as entities within
the intelligence community and we intend to do a full overview of all of those programs. find we didh we may not even know about. so once your confirmation is complete, we will look forward to working with you in that respect to make sure that we have access to the details of all of the programs at the agency and other entities within the jurisdiction of the intelligence community. us, soey are provided to we can make sure that we have the tools with which to do our job. thank you very much. >> thank you for mentioning that. , staff just passed me a note that said you do not have to mention this, but i am going to mention it anyway. that is that the declassification process for the
benghazi report is going very slowly. do to beyou can helpful in speeding that up, we would very much appreciate. but --nator kaine senator king? >> you all have some of the most important jobs in the united states government. some of the most important jobs in the united states government because i am convinced that we are engaged in a war. harbor,r 11 was pearl in an effect. it is a different kind of war that we have been engaged in than before. people are not going to come in theoys in waves across ocean, they are going to come in the hull of a ship with a destructive device that looks like a suitcase. intelligence is so critically important. i want to stress that. youso want to stress to
your important role in the agency that you are going to be of,council of -- counsel resuming you are concerned -- you are confirmed. you are not the defense lawyer for the cia. you represent the united states and advising the cia as to what the law is. please do not misunderstand that responsibly. we, this you and committee, have a special responsibility. parte virtually any other of our government, this is a secret part. the government does not hold the checks and balances and the public and press are not present. those of us who have the responsibility of overseeing the conduct of this agency, i believe it is a special and weighty one. you especially have one.
i understand human nature. case, you really have to resist that temptation. strong in your device because otherwise there is nobody else manning the barricades of the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment and the 14th amendment. you have to help protect us. a secret agency and a democracy is almost a contradiction in terms. i understand why we need it. we definitely need it. my comments about the new kind of conflict that we are engaged in. throughout history, secret agencies tend toward abuse. that is human nature. we need to have all of the strength that we can muster to protect against that.
you are a key person in that process. really think will hard about who it is you represent and it is the people of the united states. it is not the director of the cia. it is not the director of national intelligence. you have a gravely important role and i appreciate your willingness to take it on. i am impressed by your experience and background. mean to lecture you, but i think it is so important that i had to say it. thank you very much. thank you, mr. ambassador. >> well said. heinrich, i believe you are next, and then sander levin. >> in the interest of time, i will submit additional questions for the record. writtenk that all
questions be submitted by 5:00 p.m. on friday and we have asked both of you to respond to them as soon as possible and then we can hopefully vote on your nomination. sander levin? -- senator levin? >> thank you. your response about providing documents, you said that you would do so if appropriate. that is a big loophole. what is not appropriate? give us your menu. what documents do you believe are in the possession of the cia that we should not see? pre-decisional, i assume legal, right? counsel is general in a different position. were i to be confirmed, i would make sure that you are provided with an explanation of the legal basis. on some occasions, stephen preston provided the committee
with an oral briefing as well as a written paper explaining the for classified matters and i would, of course, be comfortable doing that as well. whatever would best serve the committee's understanding of the legal basis. in terms of what is appropriate, i think that -- >> what would not be appropriate for this committee to see? >> i am not sure. i am not having insight into what types of documents the cia has and generally provides or does not provide to the committee. but it would seem that the presumption would be that it would be appropriate to share. there may be situations where there is privileged material. >> be more specific. >> there could be attorney-client privilege, for example, but there could be another way for making sure that the committee was informed.
for example, sort of a white paper type approach instead of dividing actual deliberations within the agency between the lawyers and their clients. a summary of that that was prepared with the intent of sharing it with the committee. but still true to the underlying reasoning. >> any other documents? that are not appropriate? >> i do not know. i do not know the universe of documents. >> you used the word if appropriate. inssumed you had something mind. >> i had in mind the attorney-client religion. vilege.gion -- pri bee documents could deliberative. >> even if there is no attorney-client relationship, you do not think that we are entitled to those documents?
putting aside the attorney-client relationship. >> i think there can be situations in which deliberative documents, even if they are not between -- i am trying to imagine a situation where there would not be an attorney as part of the scenario, but deliberations without attorneys could be something that would be protected by the deliberative privilege.igion -- it is important for you to understand not only the legal basis, which is what i would be responsible for, but what kind of operations and intelligence activities the cia is engaged in. >> i am going to explore that further for the record. has been trying for a long time to get documents. i think much of this committee agrees with her. it has been a frustrating experience. are there some kind of religious ileges which might exist
-- it is very vague stuff and it is just not acceptable for an oversight process to be told that. i think most members of the committee support our chairman in getting answers. just one other question, going back to the question that i was alluding to before. i want to talk about waterboarding for a minute. in your judgment, is waterboarding torture? >> yes, both the president and the attorney general has said that it is torture and they have outlawed that. for the people who were involved in the program who relied on what was authoritative device from the department of justice and who did so recently and in good faith, i do not believe they should be punished. >> that was not my question. in your opinion, is waterboarding -- you have given
us the president's opinion and the attorney general's opinion and i want to know your opinion. >> my opinion is yes. >> is it torture under the geneva convention? >> i have not looked at that, but i think we would invite -- we would be in violation of him in article three, yes. article three, yes. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. let me thank our witnesses. this is always hard and a tense time. that youuch appreciate are on the record. what we do is sensitive and the need is for cooperation. we believe that the american people deserve that to the extent that we can achieve it. positionsth in vital and we look forward to having a positive relationship with you and hopefully we will be able to move these nominations shortly. so thank you very much and the hearing is adjourned.
>> thank you very much. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> according to the white house, president obama and russian president vladimir putin spoke today for about an hour. president obama said the crimean referendum would never be recognized by the united states and he asked russia to support the deployment of international monitors to prevent acts of violence. also reiterated that secretary of state john kerry is willing to work with the russian foreign minister to find a diplomatic solution to
the crisis, but not while russian military forces continue their incursion into ukrainian territory. conversation with supreme court justice of elena kagan. she talks about the court and constitutional law, live from the georgetown university law center. >> i think what happens to hoover as the oppression deepens , and people did not know it was a great depression from day one. they thought it was a typical cyclical event. when that pattern did not hold and the depression deepened, we found ourselves -- hoover found himself under greater pressure from the left for greater expenditures and intervention in the economy. he started to hold the line and became a fiscal conservative, balance the budget, save the gold standard. that perceived rigidity is part
of the reason he got attacked for not doing anything. for hisuite activist time, including some policy that might not have been all that effective. on the other hand, he was valiantly struggling against a total status turn such as esau coming in the new deal. coming in thesaw new deal. >> george nash, coming up tonight on "afterwards -- on "after words". your calls,take e-mails, and tweets. joinmonth on "book club", the discussion of the new biography of stokely carmichael. >> we were focused on making sure that we can eliminate barriers, getting those networks
in place. building out these networks is our priority. localmes, there are issues. sometimes, there are federal rules that might affect how we deploy things and the impact on his door excites or the environment. or theoric sites environment. at the same time, we want to move forward on deployment. our customers, those who use these devices everyday, depend on having a good, strong connection to get the data they want when they want it. that means having a really robust wireless network. >> the wireless infrastructure, monday on "the communicators" on c-span 2. c-span, "q&a" with cast some steam -- cass s unstein.
followed by the british house of commons and "question time". then, the senate intelligence committee and cia. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] q&a, cassek on sunstein discusses his latest book. knowledge --d "why nudge?" decidedus, when you what to do in your life and when. >> it was after i clerk for the supreme court. i thought if i would